RésuméDepuis l'ékpoque du Cercle de Vienne on consière l'explication en tant que tâche centrale de la philosophie analytique. Cependant il n'y a pas unanimité autour de la compréhension du concept d'explication. Dans cet article nous suggérons, tout en suivant Bachelard, de considérer une explication d'un concept en tant que sa généralisation propre dans le cadre d'une théorie explicative. Nous examinons notre approche en envisageant l'explication des concepts logiques , mathématiques et de la philosophie des sciences.

In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the dichotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new (...) way. (shrink)

In this paper we use some ideas of Hertz and Duhem to propose a new concept of representation that overcomes the dichotomy between representation and intervention. It is based on the category-theoretical notion of adjoint situations and is used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.

In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the dichotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the relation berween empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new (...) way. (shrink)

In this paper we use some ideas of Hertz and Duhem to propose a new concept of representation that overcomes the dichotomy between representation and intervention. It is based on the category-theoretical notion of adjoint situations and is used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.

In this paper we discuss three examples of the appropriation of Kuhn’s ideas in philosophy of science. First we deal with classical logical empiricism. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the arch-logical empiricist Carnap considered Kuhn’s socio-historical account as a useful complementation, and not as a threat of the philosophy of science of logical empiricism. As a second example we consider the attempt of the so-called struc- turalist philosophy of science to provide a “rational reconstruction” of Kuhn’s approach. Finally, we will deal with (...) Friedman’s proposal to apply Kuhn’s ideas to the formulation of a modernized, historically enlightened Kantian approach that is based on the concept of a non-apodictic constitutive and historically moving a priori. (shrink)

Contents: Preface. Introduction. J. ECHEVERRIA, A. IBARRA and T. MORMANN: The Long and Winding Road to the Philosophy of Science in Spain. REPRESENTATION AND MEASUREMENT. A. IBARRA and T. MORMANN: Theories as Representations. J. GARRIDO GARRIDO: The Justification of Measurement. O. FERNÁNDEZ PRAT and D. QUESADA: Spatial Representations and Their Physical Content. J.A. DIEZ CALZADA: The Theory-Net of Interval Measurement Theory. TRUTH, RATIONALITY, AND METHOD. J.C. GARCÍA-BERMEJO OCHOA: Realism and Truth Approximation in Economic Theory. W.J. GONZALEZ: (...) Rationality in Economics and Scientific Predictions: A Critical Reconstruction of Bounded Rationality and Its Role in Economic Predictions. J.P. ZAMORA BONILLA: An Invitation to Methodonomics. LOGICS, SEMANTICS, AND THEORETICAL STRUCTURES. J.L. FALGUERA: A Basis for a Formal Semantics of Linguistic Formulations of Science. A. SOBRINO and E. TRILLAS: Can Fuzzy Logic Help to Pose Some Problems in the Philosophy of Science? J. de LORENZO: Demonstrative Ways in Mathematical Doing. M. CASANUEVA: Genetics and Fertilization: A Good Marriage. C.U. MOULINES: The Concept of Universe from a Metatheoretical Point of View. List of Contributors. Index of Names. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that philosophy of science is in need of a comprehensive and deep theory of scientific representation. We contend that such a theory has to take into account the conceptual evolution of the notion of representation in the empirical science and mathematics.In particular, it is pointed out that the category-theoretical notion of an adjoint situation may be useful to shed new light on the intricate relation between the empirical and the theoretical by showing that scientific representations (...) do not mirror reality but are to be conceived as devices for establishing scenarios for a variety of possible representational interventions and interpretations. (shrink)

In this paper we argue for the thesis that theories are to be considered as representations. The term "representation" is used in a sense inspired by its mathematical meaning. Our main thesis asserts that theories of empirical theories can be conceived as geometrical representations. This idea may be traced back to Galileo. The geometric format of empirical theories should not be simply considered as a clever device for displaying a theory. Rather, the geometrical character deeply influences the theory s ontology. (...) We argue that it would be desastrous for philosophy if it followed Rorty s "neo-pragmatic" proposal to discard the concept of representation from philosophical discourse. (shrink)

En la estructura de una teoría se han distinguido tradicionalmente dos niveles conceptual y metodológicamente distintos: el nivel empirico y el teórico. Sostenemos que este enfoque de! doble nivel es incompleto y que conduce además a distorsiones, tanto en la comprensión filosofíca de las teorías como en la de su uso en la praxis científica. En este artículo se diseña un nuevo enfoque, segun el cual las teorías se conciben como estructuras representacionales tripartitas, que comprenden tres niveles conceptual y metodológicamente (...) distintos: el nivel de los datos, el de los fenómenos y el de los constructos teóricos. Se exploran las relaciones estructurales básicas entre los tres niveles y se muestran algunas aplicaciones relativas a los problemas de la idealización.Traditionally two different conceptual and methodological levels are distinguished within a theory: the empirical and the theoretical level. We argue that this two-level account is incomplete, leading to distortions of the philosophical understanding of theories and their usage in scientific praxis. We sketch a new account according to which theories are conceptualizad as three-tiered representational structures comprising three conceptually and methodologically different levels, to wit, the levels of data, phenomena and the level of theoretical constructs. Basic structural relations between these differentlevels are studied, some applications concerning problems of idealization are given. (shrink)

En esta réplica a la crítica que Sergio Martínez hace de nuestro artículo "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" sostenemos que su posición está basada en una aceptación acrítica de algunas dicotomías tradicionales y en una interpretación algo distorsionada de la historia de la filosofía. Indicamos que el enfoque expuesto en UTC no puede calificarse de formalista. En filosofía de la ciencia la distinción entre el enfoque "formalista" y el "historicista" es ya obsoleta. Por ello, tanto las herramientas formales (...) como las informales son de utilidad en la elucidación del concepto de representación, concepto clave de UTC. Además, sostenemos que los argumentos que Martínez recaba de la historia de la filosofía contra nuestro enfoque no son atinados. \\\ In this reply to Martínez's discussion of our paper "Una teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas" we argue that his criticism is informed by the uncritical acceptance of some traditional dichotomies and a rather distorted interpretation of the history of philosophy. We point out that UTC should not be characterized as a formalist approach. The distinction between "formalist" and "historicist" accounts in philosophy of science is obsolete. Henee, formal and informal means are useful for the explication of the concept of representation to be considered as a key concept of UTC. Moreover, we argue that the arguments from history of philosophy Martínez launches against our account are ill-founded. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand we want to make a contribution to the ongoing debate concerning an adequate explication of the concept of reduction. On the other hand we deal with the explication of the concept of explication itself. More precisely, first we discuss some current explicata of explication, then we show that they are inadequate for explication of concepts like implication, reduction, etc. Finally we propose a new and more adequate explicatum of explication (...) and apply it to the concept of reduction. (shrink)

The Protean Character of Mathematics SAUNDERS MAC LANE (Chicago) 1. Introduction The thesis of this paper is that mathematics is protean. ...

In this critical study of the valuable collection of essays edited by Cirera, Ibarra and Mormann, the present author not only critically assesses the different renderings of Carnap’s writings propounded by the different authors therein represented, but also sketches his own interpretation and subjects to criticism some of the presumed consequences of the demise of logical empiricism.

En este texto se examina críticamente la teoría combinatoria de las representaciones científicas de Andoni Ibarra y Thomas Mormann. El núcleo de la crítica va dirigido a mostrar que una serie de estudios sobre la ciencia, que ellos mismos mencionan, sugiere que la clasificación en tipos de representaciones propuesta es problemática. Es más, esos mismos estudios muestran que por lo menos muchas representaciones tienen una dimensión histórica que parece imposible capturar por medio del tipo de formalismo (...) propuesto. /// Ibarra and Mormann's combinatorial theory of scientific representations is subject to critical scrutiny. It is argued that the classification of types of representations offered cannot serve as a basis for an analysis of the variety of representations that happen to arise in science. Empirical studies on ways of representing used in science strongly suggest that a formal theory of representations of the kind proposed is not able to capture the historical dimension of the structure of representations. (shrink)

El ¿fisicalismo acerca de los colores¿ considera que los colores son propiedades físicas de los objetos. Durante más de tres siglos esa posición filosófica ha estado bloqueada por considerarse que no era científicamente seria. En este artículo se hace una lectura crítica de la vigencia de esa grave acusación para concluir que la supuesta incompatibilidad entre la mejor ciencia y el fisicalismo debe ser, cuanto menos, revisada.

The first aim of this paper is to prove a topological completeness theorem for a weak version of Stalnaker’s logic KB of knowledge and belief. The weak version of KB is characterized by the assumption that the axioms and rules of KB have to be satisfied with the exception of the axiom (NI) of negative introspection. The proof of a topological completeness theorem for weak KB is based on the fact that nuclei (as defined in the framework of point-free topology) (...) give rise to a profusion of topological belief operators that are compatible with the familiar topological knowledge operator. Thereby a canonical topological model for weak KB can be constructed. For this canonical model a truth lemma for the K and B holds such that a completeness theorem for KB can be proved in the familiar way. The second aim of this paper is to show that the topological interpretation of knowledge K comes along with a complete Heyting algebra of belief operators B that all fit the knowledge operator K in the sense that the pairs (K, B) satisfy all axioms of weak KB. This amounts to a pluralistic relation between knowledge and belief: Knowledge does not fully determine belief, rather it designs a conceptual space for belief operators where different (competing) belief operators coexist. (shrink)

La metateoría estructuralista concibe las teorías científicas como redes formadas por elementos teóricos que poseen la misma estructura conceptual y están interconectados por relaciones de especialización. Además, postula que gran parte de la práctica científica tiene como fin concretar el elemento básico de estas redes añadiéndoles elementos más especializados. Así, pues, concibe el núcleo básico de elementos de una teoría como el paradigma que guía su evolución y la práctica científica normal como la adición, a redes preexistentes, de nuevos elementos (...) teóricos. En el artículo se propone que, en la ecología de poblaciones, el patrón de la actividad científica es diferente, pues es habitual el uso conjunto de elementos de distintas redes. Se introduce la noción de “constelación teórica” para dar cuenta de estas prácticas científicas de integración, en una misma unidad epistémica, de elementos teóricos de redes distintas. (shrink)

This paper intends to further the understanding of the formal properties of (higher-order) vagueness by connecting theories of (higher-order) vagueness with more recent work in topology. First, we provide a “translation” of Bobzien's account of columnar higher-order vagueness into the logic of topological spaces. Since columnar vagueness is an essential ingredient of her solution to the Sorites paradox, a central problem of any theory of vagueness comes into contact with the modern mathematical theory of topology. Second, Rumfitt’s recent topological reconstruction (...) of Sainsbury’s theory of prototypically defined concepts is shown to lead to the same class of spaces that characterize Bobzien’s account of columnar vagueness, namely, weakly scattered spaces. Rumfitt calls these spaces polar spaces. They turn out to be closely related to Gärdenfors’ conceptual spaces, which have come to play an ever more important role in cognitive science and related disciplines. Finally, Williamson’s “logic of clarity” is explicated in terms of a generalized topology (“locology”) that can be considered an alternative to standard topology. Arguably, locology has some conceptual advantages over topology with respect to the conceptualization of a boundary and a borderline. Moreover, in Williamson’s logic of clarity, vague concepts with respect to a notion of a locologically inspired notion of a “slim boundary” are (stably) columnar. Thus, Williamson’s logic of clarity also exhibits a certain affinity for columnar vagueness. In sum, a topological perspective is useful for a conceptual elucidation and unification of central aspects of a variety of contemporary accounts of vagueness. (shrink)

According to general wisdom, Carnap's quasianalysis is an ingenious but definitively flawed approach to epistemology and philosophy of science. I argue that this assessment is mistaken. Rather, Carnapian quasianalysis can be reconstructed as a special case of a general theory of structural representation. This enables us to exploit some interesting analogies of quasianalysis with the representational theory of measurement. It is shown how Goodman's well-known objections against the quasianalytical approach may be defused in the new framework. As an application, I (...) sketch how the thesis of empirical underdetermination of theories may be elucidated in the framework of quasianalysis. (shrink)

May 2020 marked the 25th anniversary of the death of Miguel Sánchez-Mazas, founder of Theoria. An International Journal of Theory, History and Foundations of Science, and regarded as the person who brought mathematical logic to Spain. Here we present some of his biographical features and a summary of his contributions, from his early work in the 1950s - introducing contemporary advances in logic and philosophy of science in a philosophically backward milieu dominated by the scholasticism of that era in Spain (...) - to the development of a project of Lebnizian lineage aimed at producing an arithmetic calculation that would elude some of the difficulties confronting Leibniz’s calculus. (shrink)

The global relation between logical empiricism and American pragmatism is one of the more difficult problems in history of philosophy. In this paper I’d like to take a local perspective and concentrate on the details that concern the vicissitudes of a philosopher who played an important role in the encounter of logical empiricism and American pragmatism, namely, Ernest Nagel. In this paper, I want to explore some aspects of Nagel’s changing attitude towards the then „new“ logical-empiricist philosophy. In the beginning (...) Nagel welcomed logical empiricism whole-heartedly. This early enthusiasm did not last. At the end of his philosophical career Nagel’s early positive attitude towards logical empiricism shown in the 1930s had been replaced by a much more reserved one. Nagel’s growing dissatisfaction with the Carnapian version of logical empiricist philosophy was clearly expressed in Nagel’s criticism of Carnap’s inductive logic and more generally in his last book Teleology Revisited and Other Essays on History and Philosophy of Science. There he critized harshly Carnap’s philosophy of science in general as ahistoric and non-pragmatist. One of the distinctive features of Nagel’s philosophy of science is the emphasis that he put on the role of history of science for philosophy of science. A compelling evidence for this attitude are his works on the history and philosophy of geometry and algebra One may say that Carnap and Nagel represented opposed possibilities of how the profession of a philosopher of science could be understood: Carnap as a „conceptual engineer“ was engaged in the task of inventing the conceptual tools for a better theoretical understanding of science, while Nagel was to be considered more as a „public intellectual“ engaged in the project of realizing a more rational and enlightened society. (shrink)